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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO

STATE OF IDAHO,

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Plaintiff-Respondent,
v.
TOMMY DEAN NASH,
Defendant-Appellant.

NO. 48642-2021
Ada County Case No. CR01-20-7768

RESPONDENT’S BRIEF

Has Nash failed to show that the district court abused its sentencing discretion when it
imposed concurrent sentences of ten years with three years determinate and five years
indeterminate on two counts of burglary, and 14 years indeterminate on each of two counts of
grand theft?
ARGUMENT
Nash Has Failed To Show That The District Court Abused Its Sentencing Discretion
A.

Introduction
Tommy Dean Nash entered the St. Al’s Medical Arts Building and stole Elizabeth Barber’s

bag, wallet, and keys, then used the keys to steal her car. (PSI, p. 9.) Police later found Nash
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driving another stolen car, but he eluded capture at that time. (PSI, p. 9.) The state charged Nash
with two counts of burglary and two counts of grand theft in relation to his stealing Elizabeth
Barber’s possessions and car. (R., pp. 72-73.) Nash pled guilty on all counts in this case and
eluding in another case in exchange for dismissal of other charges and cases. (R., p. 83, 94-96.)
The district court imposed concurrent sentences of ten years with three years determinate, five
years indeterminate, 14 years indeterminate, and 14 years indeterminate. (R., pp. 114-17.) Nash
filed a timely notice of appeal. (R., pp. 122-23.)
On appeal Nash asserts the mitigating factors of “mental health, childhood, support
network, and employment” render his sentences unreasonable.

(Appellant’s brief, p. 4.)

Considering all of the facts of this case Nash has failed to show any abuse of discretion.
B.

Standard Of Review
The length of a sentence is reviewed under an abuse of discretion standard considering the

defendant’s entire sentence. State v. Oliver, 144 Idaho 722, 726, 170 P.3d 387, 391 (2007) (citing
State v. Strand, 137 Idaho 457, 460, 50 P.3d 472, 475 (2002); State v. Huffman, 144 Idaho 201,
159 P.3d 838 (2007)). Where a sentence is within statutory limits, the appellant bears the burden
of demonstrating that it is a clear abuse of discretion. State v. Baker, 136 Idaho 576, 577, 38 P.3d
614, 615 (2001) (citing State v. Lundquist, 134 Idaho 831, 11 P.3d 27 (2000)). In evaluating
whether a lower court abused its discretion, the appellate court conducts a four-part inquiry, which
asks “whether the trial court: (1) correctly perceived the issue as one of discretion; (2) acted within
the outer boundaries of its discretion; (3) acted consistently with the legal standards applicable to
the specific choices available to it; and (4) reached its decision by the exercise of reason.” State
v. Herrera, 164 Idaho 261, 270, 429 P.3d 149, 158 (2018) (citing Lunneborg v. My Fun Life, 163
Idaho 856, 863, 421 P.3d 187, 194 (2018)).
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C.

Nash Has Shown No Abuse Of The District Court’s Discretion
To bear the burden of demonstrating an abuse of discretion, the appellant must establish

that, under any reasonable view of the facts, the sentence was excessive. State v. Farwell, 144
Idaho 732, 736, 170 P.3d 397, 401 (2007). In determining whether the appellant met this burden,
the court considers the entire sentence but, because the decision to release the defendant on parole
is exclusively the province of the executive branch, presumes that the determinate portion will be
the period of actual incarceration. State v. Bailey, 161 Idaho 887, 895, 392 P.3d 1228, 1236 (2017)
(citing Oliver, 144 Idaho at 726, 170 P.3d at 391). To establish that the sentence was excessive,
the appellant must demonstrate that reasonable minds could not conclude the sentence was
appropriate to accomplish the sentencing goals of protecting society, deterrence, rehabilitation,
and retribution. Farwell, 144 Idaho at 736, 170 P.3d at 401. A sentence is reasonable “‘if it appears
necessary to accomplish the primary objective of protecting society and to achieve any or all of
the related goals of deterrence, rehabilitation, or retribution.’” Bailey, 161 Idaho at 895-96, 392
P.3d at 1236-37 (quoting State v. McIntosh, 160 Idaho 1, 8, 368 P.3d 621, 628 (2015)).
The district court considered the relevant facts and evidence. (Tr., p. 37, Ls. 5-15.) The
district court specifically considered Nash’s “serious mental illnesses,” especially the diagnosis of
a “full-fledged” personality disorder that is “less amenable to treatment” and renders Nash a “high
risk to reoffend.” (Tr., p. 37, L. 16 – p. 38, L. 15.) The district court’s “first and foremost” priority
was to “protect the public.” (Tr., p. 39, Ls. 1-9.) However, that had to be balanced with Nash’s
intelligence and mental illness. (Tr., p. 39, Ls. 9-16.) The district court then rejected probation
and imposed the sentences after taking into account all the relevant factors and considering the
materials before it. (Tr., p. 39, L. 17 – p. 41, L. 17.)
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The record supports the district court’s exercise of discretion in imposing aggregate
sentences of 14 years with three years determinate on four felony convictions. Nash’s criminal
record is lengthy, spanning nearly 30 years and including crimes of violence, burglary, and theft.
(PSI, pp. 11-13, 20-22, 27.) The district court had before it extensive evidence of Nash’s mental
health history, diagnoses, and recommendations. (PSI, pp. 1-7, 13-14, 25, 29-43, 401-11, 327-33,
412-41.) The psychological evaluation concluded Nash was a high risk to reoffend and had a low
level of amenability to treatment. (PSI, pp. 412-13, 437-38.) His “main issues appear to be
Antisocial and Borderline Personality Disorders.” (PSI, pp. 2, 6-7; see also pp. 14, 43, 410, 430.)
The district court properly concluded that, given Nash’s history and prospects, protecting the
community required aggregate prison sentences of three years minimum to be served with a
potential parole of up to eleven additional years.
On appeal Nash contends there are mitigating factors, primarily adopting his trial counsel’s
argument as his argument on appeal. (Appellant’s brief, pp. 4-7.) The district court necessarily
considered the factors argued by Nash and balanced them in imposing a reasonable sentence. Nash
has failed to show an abuse of discretion.
CONCLUSION
The state respectfully requests this Court to affirm the judgment of the district court.
DATED this 3rd day of September, 2021.

/s/ Kenneth K. Jorgensen
KENNETH K. JORGENSEN
Deputy Attorney General
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that I have this 3rd day of September, 2021, served a true and correct
copy of the foregoing RESPONDENT’S BRIEF to the attorney listed below by means of iCourt
File and Serve:
EMILY M. JOYCE
DEPUTY STATE APPELLATE PUBLIC DEFENDER
documents@sapd.state.id.us

KKJ/dd

/s/ Kenneth K. Jorgensen
KENNETH K. JORGENSEN
Deputy Attorney General
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